Pick five tokenized stocks, set the weights and the leverage, ship an ERC-20 anyone can mint or redeem for USDG. The leverage has a ceiling nobody can raise, and every change whoever runs it makes lands a day later, in public, with the door open.
Either the leverage quietly goes up, or the person running the thing changes it under you. A Fivex basket is five synthetic positions, one number for how levered they are, and a manager whose every move is proposed a day before it lands. Nothing is bought, nothing is unwound through a pool, and what a holder bought is what a holder holds.
A basket is a claim on a book. The pools are read, never traded, and one USDG vault takes the other side of what every basket nets out to. These are the rules that keep the claim honest.
MAX_LEVERAGE_BPS = 30_000 is a constant in the contract, not a parameter anyone holds a key to. Underneath it, every basket carries its own cap, chosen when it ships. Every proposal is checked against that cap, lowerCap is the only function that touches it, and it only goes one way.
Prices move, so a basket drifts off its target. Once any leg or the leverage itself is 10% away, anyone may put it back, for a fee on the turnover alone. That is what sells a losing basket down before it can be liquidated, and a liquidation, when it comes, closes the basket to cash rather than to zero.
Nothing about a basket is set directly. Legs, weights, leverage and the manager's fee go through propose, wait twenty-four hours, and land through execute, which anyone may call for the week after. Handing the basket to somebody else takes the same road.
The proposal is public state the whole time. The desk shows what is coming and the countdown to it, and since redeeming is never barred, a holder who dislikes the change leaves before it arrives. A manager can be paid, up to 2% a year streamed as shares, and cannot raise that either without the same day's notice.
Each stock's price comes off its deepest USDG pool on Uniswap v4, and a spot read on a pool that size is a faucet, not an oracle. So each leg keeps an anchor that anyone may step toward spot by at most 1% every five minutes. Walking it 30% takes hours of holding a pool off its price while handing everyone else a standing arbitrage.
An anchor lags, and a directional product cannot pretend otherwise. Minters are entered on every leg at the worse of mark and spot, and what that costs against the anchor comes off their own share count, so nobody already inside pays for it. Redeemers are exited the same way while a leg is unstable. Adding risk waits for the anchor; leaving never does.
Weights sum to one hundred in absolute value, and a weight can be negative: long NVDA against short SPY is a basket, five longs is a basket, a leg at zero is not. The leverage applies to the whole thing and stops at the cap you set.
Minting puts USDG in and scales every leg up by the same fraction, so nobody's exposure changes when somebody else joins. Redeeming scales every leg down and pays USDG out. The token ships in one transaction, with a name and a ticker, and opens on its first mint.
Every row is the contract's own state: the legs, what one share is worth in USDG right now, live leverage against the target, and whether a change is on its way.
| Basket | Share | Net assets | Leverage | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reading the chain. | ||||
Every leg is an official Robinhood stock token. It prices from its deepest USDG pool; any pool holding at least 1% of that liquidity is a rival that must agree within 10%, or there is no agreed price and the stock is not listed. Open interest per side is capped at a quarter of the deepest pool's USDG reserve.
Longs and shorts across every basket net against each other per stock, and that matched notional costs the vault nothing. Only the skew left over is the vault's book, bounded against vault assets, so a depositor lends into a position whose worst case is a stated fraction of the pot. Nobody can withdraw below that line while baskets are open.
Funding is the skew fee alone. Per stock, the heavy side pays and the light side receives, at one rate proportional to how one-sided that stock is. The vault keeps the difference, which is the rate on exactly the risk it carries. There is no interest term, because both sides are financed in the same USDG, and no dividend term, because these are ERC-8056 tokens and the pool price already carries it.
The vault is empty, so no basket can be minted yet. The first deposit of at least 25 USDG opens the whole thing; after that any size works.
Because the number is the product. A basket with one leg is a perp, and a basket with twenty is an index fund that has to be rebalanced by a keeper. Five is enough to express a view and few enough that a holder can read every position on one screen. The count is a constant, so every basket on the contract is the same shape.
As equity falls, live leverage rises. Once it is 10% over target, anyone may rebalance, which sells the basket down to target for a fee on the turnover. If a gap gets there first and equity falls through 7.5% of gross notional, anyone may liquidate: every leg is closed at the anchor, the liquidator takes half the maintenance buffer out of what is left, and the shares now hold that cash. The manager may re-lever it. Holders never owe anything; a hole beyond the collateral is the vault's loss and is written off in public.
The manager never holds the USDG; the contract does, and the only way out is redeem, which pays whoever burns the shares. What a manager can do is change what the basket holds, and only with a day's notice. The fee they can charge is capped at 2% a year and changing it takes the same day. Rebalancing by hand is rate-limited to once an hour, so a manager cannot churn fees out of holders between proposals.
Nineteen at the last read. A leg needs one pool deep enough that nobody can buy its mark, and every rival pool with a real share of the liquidity has to agree on the price. CRCL fails that: its pools quote $68 and $86 and nothing on the chain says which is right. SPCX is left out on purpose, being a private-company proxy with no underlying anyone can check.
The contracts are live on Robinhood Chain and unaudited. Engine ·, oracle ·. The pools behind the legs are thin by the standards of a large venue, which is what the anchor and the open-interest caps exist to blunt. If nobody pokes the anchors for an hour a basket's legs go stale and minting stops until somebody does; the desk shows the button. Leverage does what leverage does. Nothing here is investment advice.